This paper explores the e¤ects of capital controls and policies regulating interest rates and the exchange rate in a model of economic transition applied to China. We build on Song et al. (2011) who construct a growth model consistent with salient features of the recent Chinese growth experience: high output growth, sustained returns on capital investment, extensive reallocation within the manufacturing sector, sluggish wage growth, and accumulation of a large trade surplus. The salient features of the theory are asymmetric …nancial imperfections and heterogeneous productivity across private and state-owned …rms. Capital controls and regulation of banks'deposit rates sti ‡e competition in the banking sector and hamper the lending to productive private …rms. Removing such regulation would accelerate the growth in productivity and output. A temporarily undervalued exchange rate reduces real wages and consumption, stimulating investments in the high-productivity entrepreneurial sector. This fosters productivity growth and a trade surplus. A high interest rate mitgates the disadvantage of …nancially constrained …rms, reduces wages, and increases the speed of transition from low-to high-productivity …rms.
Introduction
Economic theory predicts that capital should ‡ow towards countries, regions and …rms where it commands the highest returns. Yet, this prediction is contradicted by the data: Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) document that, within non-OECD economies, capital in ‡ows are negatively correlated with productivity and output growth. On average, capital does not ‡ow to the countries that o¤er the best investment opportunities. This observation has been labeled the "allocation puzzle". Due to its size and to the large current account surpluses it has run over the last 15 years, China is a fundamental piece of this puzzle. In spite of the high return to real investment, China has been a large capital exporter, amassing reserves amounting to almost 4 trillion USD in the end of …rst quarter of 2014.
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In Song et al. (2011) , henceforth SSZ, we document that a version of the allocation puzzle is also found within China (see also Cudrè 2014). Regions and …rms where capital commands the highest returns fail to attract …nancial resources. For instance, the gap between savings and investment is positively correlated with productivity at the provincial level. SSZ proposes a structural explanation for this pattern, and for the associated accumulation of foreign reserves. The predictions of our theory are consistent with some salient stylized facts about China's economy since 1992: high output growth, sustained returns on capital investments, an extensive reallocation within the manufacturing sector, and sluggish wage growth.
The building blocks of the theory are asymmetric …nancial imperfections and di¤er-ences in productivity across …rms. More speci…cally, we construct a competitive economy populated by two sets of …rms. The former have access to more productive technologies, but are subject to tighter …nancial constraints. In a frictionless environment, the less productive …rms would be driven out by competition. However, these can survive, thanks to their better access to credit markets. The credit market imperfections constrain the growth of the more productive …rms, whose investments must be …nanced largely from retained earnings. Thus, the demise of the less productive sector is gradual. During the 1 Caselli and Feyrer (2007) argue that a properly measured return to capital is approximately equalized across a sample of countries which excludes China. Their main point is that one should correct for di¤erences in the relative price of capital when calculating its rate of return. The Bai et al. (2007) estimate of the rate of return on capital for China includes such an adjustment, and …nds that China has a signi…cantly higher rate of return on capital than most countries. See Bai et al. (2007), p.65. transition, the high-productivity …rms outgrow the low-productivity …rms and attract an increasing employment share. The downsizing of the low-productivity …rms implies that a growing share of domestic savings will be invested in foreign assets, generating a trade surplus. 2 SSZ assumes, for simplicity, a laissez-faire environment, with the government playing no active role in setting the exchange rate, interest rate, etc. In reality, the Chinese government uses a variety of policy instruments that a¤ect prices and resource allocation.
For instance, capital controls, interest rate regulations and reserve requirements have been pervasive (see, e.g., Obstfeld and Rogo¤ 2005) . In addition, while China has been a very open economy to international trade and to inward foreign direct investments, crossborder portfolio ‡ows have been subject to tight regulations. Chinese private investors cannot trade in foreign assets, nor can foreign investors access Chinese …nancial markets.
The RMB today is convertible only for trade transactions. There are exemptions, as we document below, but these are still limited. The gross cross-border ‡ow of assets is still moderate, relative to China's GDP. China is in this sense similar to the other large emerging economies (Gourinchas and Rey 2013) .
In this paper, we study how capital controls and regulations of the …nancial system a¤ect key measures of economic performance, such as wage growth, productivity growth, and trade surplus. To this end, we extend the SSZ model to incorporate explicitly a range of …nancial market regulations: controls of deposit and lending rates, restrictions over cross-border …nancial investments, interest rate and exchange rate policies. We also evaluate the welfare e¤ects of such policies.
The model economy is a non-monetary small "semi-open economy" where consumers demand two goods, one produced by domestic …rms and one produced abroad. As in SSZ there are pervasive frictions in the domestic economy. The more productive …rms are credit constrained, while the less productive …rms have access to external (bank) …nancing. Due to capital controls, domestic savers, …rms, and banks cannot access the international credit market. Nor are foreign agents allowed to hold any domestic assets.
Only the government (e.g., through the central bank) can hold positive or negative debt positions versus the rest of the world, matching trade ‡ow imbalances. In this sense the economy is semi-open, as in previous work by Jeanne (2012) , and Bacchetta et al. (2013 2 An implication of this view is that …nancial reforms enabling entrepreneurs to borrow more would reduce the trade surplus. However, this conclusion depends on the details of the model. Martin and Ventura (2012) show that the e¤ect of a …nancial reform on the trade surplus hinges on two opposing forces -the additional investments of high-productivity …rms versus the resources released by lowproductivity …rms.
and 2014).
We use this model to study the e¤ect of a number of policies in ‡uencing …nancial markets. First, the government …xes the relative price at which domestic goods are traded for foreign goods (i.e., the real exchange rate). This policy is implemented through a restriction on the market access for foreign exporters, which we label this as the (real) exchange rate policy (ERP). The main focus here is on the case of a temporarily undervalued exchange rate, which is relevant for the debate about China. Namely, the government makes foreign goods arti…cially more expensive relative to home goods.
Second, the government sets the interest rate on domestic government bonds, and issues domestic bonds so as to meet the demand at that rate. We label this as the interest rate policy (IRP). Third, the government regulates the spread between the deposit and lending rates o¤ered by domestic banks by imposing a ceiling on the interest rates banks can o¤er to depositors. We label this as the deposit rate policy (DRP). This regulation in ‡uences competition in the banking sector. Since banks are not allowed to compete in o¤ering better conditions to borrowers and lenders, the muted competition among banks creates an incumbency advantage. In China incumbent banks are state-owned, and are, as we document in SSZ, biased against …nancing private enterprises. This barrier to entry has potentially important implications for the e¢ ciency of the banking sector and, ultimately, aggregate productivity. As we discuss below, the government is currently deregulating the banking industry. We use our theory to explore the e¤ect of this regulation. Finally, we consider the e¤ect of full …nancial deregulation: removing all restrictions on cross-border ‡ows, interest rates and exchange rates.
Consider, …rst, the ERP. An undervalued exchange rate decreases the demand for foreign goods, and reduces real wages. Since the ERP is assumed to be temporary, this generates in addition an intertemporal substitution in consumption, fostering savings at the expenses of consumption, a mechanism similar to that emphasized by Dornbusch (1983) . 3 Thus, an undervalued exchange rate increases the savings gap, resulting in a trade surplus and accumulation of foreign reserves. Interestingly, this policy also a¤ects the speed of transition, since it increases the savings and investments of private entrepreneurs. Thus, the theory predicts that an undervalued exchange rate would, as often argued in the policy debate, decrease consumption and generate a trade surplus, even in the absence of any nominal rigidities. Over time, the exchange rate policy speeds up the accumulation of entrepreneurial capital, thereby accelerating TFP and economic growth. This trade-o¤ between static losses and dynamic gains of the exchange rate policy are reminiscent of that emphasized by the mercantilist export-led-growth view (see, e.g., Korinek and Servén 2010, and Rodrik 2009 ). However, these authors emphasize the role of dynamic externalities in manufacturing (as in Lucas 1988) or, more speci…cally, in the export sector. While this complementary mechanism might be important in reality, our mechanism does not hinge on any such externality.
Consider, next, the IRP. In a standard model, a low interest rate has an expansionary e¤ect by lowering the borrowing cost for investing …rms. In our model the real interest rate has an additional general equilibrium e¤ect (one that is absent in the case of the ERP): it distorts the allocation of resources between private and state-owned …rms.
Namely, when the banks' lending rate is low, …nancially unconstrained state-owned …rms increase their capital-labor ratios. This increases the equilibrium wage rate. In turn, high wages reduce the pro…tability of …nancially constrained …rms, slowing down capital accumulation in the entrepreneurial sector, and hence, hampering the transition from low-productivity to high-productivity …rms. Therefore, a low interest rate has on the one hand an expansionary e¤ect (through both higher wages increasing aggregate consumption, and higher investments of …nancially integrated …rms). On the other hand, it reduces productivity growth and hampers reallocation, reducing economic growth.
One should also note that a low interest rate decreases the trade surplus. This is per se not surprising, although the channel in our theory is di¤erent from the standard ones.
Both the ERP and IRP have non-trivial distributional e¤ects. An undervalued exchange rate hurts the early generations of both workers and entrepreneurs, due to the distortion of consumption. Yet, the future generations of workers and entrepreneurs gain from this policy, as larger investments trigger the earlier onset of fast wage growth. As far as the IRP is concerned, while a high interest rate hurts early generations of workers through low wages, it bene…ts future generations of workers (possibly, far in time) by speeding up transition.
Finally, consider the DRP. This is an especially topical policy; until July 2013, Chinese banks could compete neither in the loan market (by o¤ering lower interest rates to borrowers) nor in the deposit market (by o¤ering higher interest rate to depositors).
Ceilings on deposit rates are still in place as we write, although the People's Bank of China (PBOC) has recently announced its intention to lift them, too. We focus on the e¤ect of removing the ceilings on deposit rates. We …nd two main results. First, if there is no heterogeneity between incumbent and potential new banks, then the deposit rate deregulation has no e¤ect over and above increasing the rate of return earned by depositors. In this case, the deregulation would increase consumption of the old and reduce the trade surplus slightly, without any e¤ect on productivity. Deregulation has a farther-reaching e¤ect if the increasing competition in the banking industry triggers the entry of new banks that are less entrenched with state-owned enterprises, and hence more prone to lend to the most productive private …rms. In this case, deregulation will ultimately increase access to external …nancing for high-productivity …rms owned by private entrepreneurs. This speeds up reallocation and productivity growth and reduces the trade surplus.
The article is structured as follows: In section 2, we describe the main aspects of the Chinese policies (capital controls, interest rate controls, etc.) over the last two decades.
In section 3 we present the model. Section 4 investigate the exchange rate-and interest rate policy experiments. Section 5 studies the e¤ect of reforming the …nancial market system. Section 6 concludes.
Facts
In this section, we present two sets of empirical facts. We …rst document the dynamics of foreign reserves, exchange rates, capital controls, and capital ‡ows. We then describe how monetary policy has been conducted over the last two decades. The aim is to provide a set of stylized facts upon which we will base the theoretical discussion in the subsequent sections of the paper.
Foreign Reserves and Exchange Rates
China transformed its dual-track exchange rate system into a semi-pegged regime in 1994. Panel A of Figure 1 Figure 1: The dotted and solid lines in Panel A plot quarterly nominal and real exchange rates between RMB and USD, respectively. The dashed line is the real e¤ective exchange rate. We use in ‡ation rates in China and the US to compute real exchange rates. The initial rates are normalized to 100. The dashed and solid lines in Panel B plot annual real e¤ective exchange rate and surplus GDP ratio (%), respectively.
rate, resulting in a signi…cant real appreciation. Note that the dynamics of the REER are very similar to those of the real exchange rate vis-à-vis the USD.
Panel B of Figure 1 plots the dynamics of trade surplus (as a share of GDP) vs. the REER. Since 1997, China has run large trade surpluses. The graph illustrates that the trade surplus dynamics are negatively correlated with the real exchange rates until the global …nancial crisis. In particular, the trade surplus grew strongly during the periods 1994-1997 and 2004-2008 , and the REER appreciated during these time periods. Moreover, the trade surplus fell over the 1998 -2004 Although it cannot be given a causal interpretation, this time-series correlation suggests that changes in trade surplus do not coincide with the depreciation of the RMB, but rather the opposite, counter to the view that the currency undervaluation is a major cause of the trade surplus.
The persistent trade surpluses have given rise to an exceptional accumulation of foreign reserves, de…ned as foreign bonds and currency held by the Chinese central bank. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the foreign reserves-to-GDP ratio (solid blue line), the net international investment position relative to GDP (black dashed line), and the di¤erence between deposit and loans in the domestic Chinese banks, also measured as a percentage of GDP (dotted red line). 5 The key observation is that the accumulation of foreign reserves re ‡ects a growing domestic savings gap.
Capital Controls
Capital ‡ows to and from China are subject to pervasive controls. Indeed, while the RMB has been fully convertible for current account transactions since 1996, the Chinese government has retained strong controls on the capital accounts. Controls are exercised mainly by restricting international portfolio investments, though there are also some restrictions on direct investment. 6 Consequently, portfolio investment ‡ows in and out of China are rather small, as seen in Tables 1 and 2 . Figure 2 is an updated version of Figure 1 in SSZ, where the data end in 2007. Two observations are worth mentioning. First, China's foreign reserves continue to grow, rising from 1.9 trillion USD in 2007 to 3.2 trillion USD by the end of 2011. Unlike the pattern before 2007 when foreign reserves tended to outgrow GDP, foregin reserves and GDP have almost the same growth rate, leaving the foreign reserves GDP ratio roughly unchanged (43 and 44 percent for 2007 and 2011, respectively). Second, foreign reserves and the di¤erence between bank deposits and loans continue to move in tandem, attesting to a key prediction of SSZ that China's surplus is essentially driven by the declining demand for funds from …nancially integrated domestic …rms. 6 For instance, foreign direct investment in the service sector is more heavily regulated than in manufacturing. See Table 1 in Shu et al. (2008) for more detailed description on capital controls in China.
for instance, is merely 16 percent of the total inward direct investment. Cappiello and Ferrucci (2008) and Shu et al. (2008) In summary, capital controls appear to be highly asymmetric in China, with limited barriers to direct investments but tight controls on portfolio investments. Retail interest rates are heavily regulated, though some of the restrictions have been relaxed since the late 1990s. The central bank imposes an upper bound on deposit rates and a lower bound on lending rates. The ceiling for the deposit rate used to be the benchmark rate itself. In 2012 this bound was relaxed to 10 percent above the benchmark rate. Similarly, the ‡oor of lending rate is 10 percent below its benchmark rate, with an exception for the mortgage rate which is allowed to be 30% below the benchmark rate. 10 The ceiling on deposit rate are generally binding. The actual average lending rates are above the ‡oor (Porter and Xu, 2009) , though the di¤erence is not large.
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The tight regulation of interest rates on deposits and loans has sti ‡ed competition in the banking industry. Potential competitors have been prevented from o¤ering better conditions to attract borrowers and lenders. This setting has preserved a strong market power for the four major banks. Moreover, the capital controls and …nancial restrictions make it di¢ cult for banks to obtain other sources of …nancing than bank deposits. The ceiling on deposit rates is, therefore, a key policy constraint that prevents private banks from acquiring larger market shares. The situation is currently changing, though, and the current Chinese government led by Li Keqiang has taken some partial liberalization measures. In July 2013, the PBOC scrapped the ‡oor on lending rates, allowing banks and lending rate (dotted lines) dictated by the government. We also include the threemonth US T-bill rate as a measure of the world interest rate (solid lines). The …rst observation is that China's real deposit and lending rates move closely with the real world interest rate, with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.89 from 1998 through 2012. More importantly, the real deposit rate in China is slightly higher on average than its US counterpart in most periods since 1998. The average real deposit rate is 0.91% from 1998 through 2012, while the average US real interest rate is virtually equal to zero (-0.01%). The real interest rate gap has been widening recently, reaching an average of 1.88 percentage points in 2011 and 2012. 12 In addition to regulating banks' interest rates, the PBOC has been adjusting the 
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The PBOC started to reduce CBB after 2008. One likely reason behind this change is that the PBOC may have decided to rely more on reserve requirements, which were tightened already in 2007. Once these requirements became binding for most banks, the PBOC could pursue a contractionary policy by altering the reserve requirements, without the need to issue CBB. An alternative theory for why the CBB program was scaled back could be that it was perceived to be an ine¤ective policy. For example, He and Wang (2012) suggest that the interest rates in the interbank money market responds strongly to changes in the deposit rate and in the required reserve ratio, but is less sensitive to open market operations. Note that, although the retail interest rates are heavily regulated, the wholesale interest rates in the interbank money market are 
Summarizing the facts
We now summarize the main facts for exchange rate policy, monetary policies, capital controls, and trade surpluses. In the next section we lay out a theory that will allow us to analyze the e¤ects of these policies.
1. China's trade surplus has been growing at times when its real exchange rate has been appreciating, and has been falling at times when its real exchange rate has been depreciating, with the exception of the …nancial crisis at which time the trade surplus shrank.
2. China has pervasive capital controls on portfolio investment: Chinese households are prevented from holding foreign assets, and foreigners are prevented from purchasing Chinese assets. Direct investments are signi…cantly less regulated.
3. China has regulated the interest rates o¤ered by banks, imposing a ‡oor on lending rates and a ceiling on deposit rates. This has sti ‡ed competition in the banking industry. The government has recently introduced some partial liberalization.
4. Since 1997, China's domestic real interest rates has remained above the US interest rates most of the time.
The Benchmark Model
In this section, we develop a theory of economic transition in China. Our purpose is to study the implications for welfare and economic outcomes of the policies discussed in the previous sections. The model extends the framework of SSZ to a setting with multiple goods and an explicit role for government policy.
Preferences, Technology and Markets
Preferences and Population: The model economy is populated by overlapping generations of two-period lived agents who work in the …rst period and live o¤ savings in the second period. Agents consume two goods, a domestically produced good (c) and a foreign produced good (c ).
Preferences are parameterized by the following time-separable utility function:
( 1 1= ) (1)
where is the discount factor, is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) of consumption, and " is the (Armington) elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. We assume that 1; implying that agents'savings are non-decreasing in the rate of return.
Agents have heterogeneous skills. Each cohort consists of a measure one of agents with no entrepreneurial skills (workers), and a measure of agents with entrepreneurial skills (entrepreneurs).
Technology: There are two types of …rms, both requiring capital and labor. Financially integrated (F) …rms operate as standard neoclassical …rms. Entrepreneurial (E) …rms are owned by old entrepreneurs who are residual claimants on the pro…ts and who hire young skilled workers as managers. The key assumptions are that E …rms are more productive than F …rms but, due to asymmetric …nancial imperfections, E …rms are barred from borrowing from banks. This is an extreme version of the more general model in SSZ where entrepreneurs can borrow up to an endogenous limit.
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The technology of F and E …rms are represented, respectively, by the following production functions:
where y is domestic output and k and n denote capital and labor, respectively. Capital depreciates fully after one period. The technology parameter A grows at an exogenous rate z; A t+1 = (1 + z) A t .
"Exchange rate policy": The model economy is part of a world comprising a con-
tinuum of small open economies with identical preferences, half of them producing the "domestic" good y and the other half producing the "foreign" good y : Since all countries are small, none can individually a¤ect the world price. The world market relative price of a home vs. foreign good is assumed to be unity. Although the government cannot a¤ect world prices, it can distort the price at which the two goods are traded domestically. The distortion is implemented by a market access restriction for foreign exporters. More precisely, we denote by e the government-set relative price ("exchange rate") at which traders can exchange domestic goods for foreign goods. We focus on e 1 capturing the notion of an "undervalued" exchange rate, which is the case debated in the Chinese setting. e > 1 implies that the government makes foreign goods arti…cially more expensive than they would be in the laissez-faire equilibrium. Since the relative price of foreign goods exceeds the international price, the local good market does not clear. In particular, foreign producers strictly prefer to sell their good in our domestic economy rather than in the international market. To enforce its policy, the government must then impose some rationing and require that foreign traders hold licenses specifying the quantity each can trade with domestic producers. 17 We view these market access restrictions as a modeling expedient to capture the notion that the government exercises monopoly power in the foreign currency market.
18 17 In principle, the government could reap rents by auctioning licenses to foreign producers. We assume that the government foregoes this opportunity and issues licenses for free. 18 If the model were extended to allow a search friction in the market for goods, along the lines of Bai et al. (2013) , it would be possible to provide an alternative microfoundation for the assumption that the government can distort the relative price of home goods and foreign goods, without rents being present and having the government impose rations and forego rents.
To see this, assume, following Bai et al. (2013) , that producers can post prices for their goods and that consumers can search in several markets. Consumers direct their search e¤ort to the markets that yield the highest expected utility -they prefer low prices and a low search e¤ort to …nd the goods. Assume that the government forces foreign producers to post their goods at a price e relative to the price posted by domestic producers. The Chinese market therefore becomes pro…table for foreign producers and the producers willingly pay an entry cost to compete in China. This makes the market tightness "Capital controls": There are four assets in the economy: domestic deposits (i.e., claims to next-period domestic goods issued by domestic banks), domestic government bonds (i.e., claims to next-period domestic goods issued by the government), foreign bonds (i.e., claims to next-period foreign goods issued by foreign agents), and domestic corporate loans (i.e., claims to next-period domestic goods issued by domestic …rms).
We assume that the government imposes capital controls: domestic agents (with the exception of the government itself) can hold only domestic assets, and foreigners cannot hold any domestic assets. The government sets the interest rate on domestic government bonds, and issues domestic bonds so as to meet the demand at that rate. We refer to this policy as an IRP. The government has access to lump-sum taxes and transfers to cover possible gains or losses on ERP and IRP. The government period budget constraint is
where t denotes the lump-sum tax levied on the young workers and R t and R w denote, respectively, the rates of return on domestic and foreign bonds. The left-hand side is the total government debt expressed as the sum of debt in domestic (b) and foreign (b f )
goods. Negative debt means a positive asset position. We assume that the government honours its debt and that it cannot run a Ponzi scheme. Note that the government itself abides by the market restriction policy: it does not convert foreign goods or assets into domestic goods at the international price, but does so at the exchange rate e:
Savings: Young workers earn a wage w t and deposit their savings s t+1 with domestic banks paying a gross interest rate R d t+1 . They choose savings so as to maximize utility, (1), subject to the two budget constraints,
We assume that households can only hold deposits in their portfolio.
Young skilled agents employed as managers in E …rms earn a compensation, m t .
Their savings can be invested either in domestic bank deposits or in physical capital (which becomes productive in the following period) installed in their own business. For simplicity, we assume that young managers neither pay taxes nor receive subsidies.
-foreign goods available for sale per domestic consumer -very high and, hence, the probability of achieving a sale very low. In equilibrium, both domestic and foreign producers break even and foreign goods are traded at a relative price e. The ine¢ ciency induced by the distorted price is that consumers search too little for the foreign goods and that too few foreign goods are consumed in equilibrium.
Banks: Banks collect deposits from workers and invest in corporate loans and government bonds. Issuing loans to …rms is subject to two sets of frictions:
1. The issuance of loans to …rms is subject to an intermediation cost, capturing operational costs, red tape, etc. We model this as an iceberg cost per period.
2. Entrepreneurs are constrained in their ability to obtain bank loans. In SSZ we assume that the output of E …rms is non-veri…able, and that entrepreneurs can only pledge to repay a share of the second-period net pro…ts. In most of the analysis in this paper we make the simplifying assumption that entrepreneurs cannot raise any external …nancing at all ( = 0). This is relaxed in Section 5.
An arbitrage condition implies that the rate of return on government bonds equals the lending rate to …rms net of the intermediation cost. More formally,
; where R l is the interest rate on loans. Moreover, in a competitive equilibrium, the rate of return on banks'assets must equal the deposit rate, R d = R.
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Since banks are pure intermediaries with no equity, their balance sheet yields:
The left-hand side are the net bank assets: government bonds and loans to F …rms. The right-hand side are the liabilities, i.e., deposits. Note that the corporate loans issued at t are equivalent to the aggregate investments in F …rms, which in turn equal K F t+1 ; due to the assumption of full capital depreciation.
F …rms: Pro…t maximization implies that R l t equals the marginal product of capital in F …rms. Let F K F = (AN F ) denote capital per e¤ective unit of labor. Then,
The wage, then, equals the value of the marginal product of labor:
Note that the wage is expressed in units of local goods. Since households consume a basket of domestic and foreign goods, an exchange rate depreciation does not a¤ect w but still reduces the real wage in terms of the composite consumption good.
E …rms: Following SSZ, we assume that E …rms must hire a manager and pay him a compensation m y in order to satisfy an incentive-compatibility constraint.
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The incentive constraint is important, since in its absence managers would be paid the workers'wage, and the equilibrium would feature no capital accumulation in E …rms and no transition from SOE to DPE. A more detailed motivation of the incentive constraint is contained in SSZ.
The value of a …rm owned by an old entrepreneur with capital k Et is given by the solution to the following problem:
The problem is subject to the incentive-compatibility constraint discussed above. This is binding in equilibrium:
Moreover, an arbitrage condition in the labor market implies that the wage, w t ; is as in (5). The optimal contract implies that the incentive constraint is binding:
Taking the …rst-order condition with respect to n E and substituting in the equilibrium wage yields the employment choice of the …rm:
The capital per e¤ective unit of labor in E …rms, denoted E;t , is then given by
Plugging (7) and (8) into (6) yields the value of the …rm:
where is the rate of return to capital in E …rms. In order to ensure that t > Rt 1 , so that entrepreneurs are credit constrained (i.e., if they were allowed to borrow at the going rate, they would like to do so), we make the following assumption:
. 20 The managerial compensation must also exceed the workers' wage rate (m t > w t ). We restrict attention to parameters and initial conditions such that the participation constraint is never binding in equilibrium.
Savings and investments decisions
In this section, we analyze the savings decisions of workers and entrepreneurs.
Workers
Workers maximize utility, (1), subject to a lifetime budget constraint, w t t = c 1;t + e t c 1;t + c 2;t+1 + e t+1 c 2;t+1 R d t+1
:
The First Order Conditions of this problem yield:
1 + e 1 + e 1 " t+1
Note that the Euler equation depends on the time evolution of the exchange rate.
In particular, if e t+1 = e t , the level of e does not matter. Consider, next, a declining sequence of e: e t > e t+1 : To …x ideas, suppose R d t+1 = 1: In this case, the consumption growth of the domestic good is positive (negative) if > " ( < "). The reason for the ambiguity in consumption growth is that, on the one hand, the consumption basket is overall more expensive in period t than in period t+1. Thus, the IES of consumption calls for a positive consumption growth in both the domestic and the foreign good. On the other hand, in period t the foreign good has a higher relative price than in period t+1. This calls for a negative consumption growth of the domestic good (i.e., in period t, the consumer substitutes the expensive foreign good with the cheaper domestic good).
Which of the two forces dominates depends on the comparison between " (the Armington elasticity) and (the IES of consumption).
Substituting in the expressions above into the budget constraints, (11), yields the expression of the consumption of the domestic good in period t for the young:
The private savings of the workers are, then, given by
As long as 1; the savings of the young workers at t increase in R d t+1 and in e t+1 =e t : However, if e t+1 = e t ; then savings do not depend on the exchange rate.
Entrepreneurs
The entrepreneurs'saving decision is similar. However, the entrepreneurs earn a managerial compensation (m t ) instead of a wage net of taxes (w t t ), and have access to an asset that yields a higher return ( t = (1 )
, since they can invest in their own business. Thus, their lifetime budget constraint can be expressed as: m t =ĉ 1;t + e tĉ 1;t +ĉ 2;t+1 + e t+1ĉ 2;t+1
where hats refer to entrepreneurial variables. Operating as above, the optimal …rst-period consumption yields:
and the aggregate entrepreneurial savings are given by:
Note thatŝ t+1 is increasing in R t+1 (since t+1 is increasing in R t+1 ), and in e t+1 =e t :
Foreign position
Let ! t denote the net position of the government at t expressed in units of domestic good. In particular, ! t is the di¤erence between the purchase of foreign bonds ( e t b f t+1 ), entitling the government to foreign goods at t + 1, and the issuance of domestic debt ( b t+1 ), committing the government to deliver domestic goods at t + 1. More formally,
Since we assumed that all bonds have a one-period maturity, and that the government neither consumes nor invests, the period budget constraint implies that the government net position must equal the di¤erence between the tax revenue at t and the interest payments on domestic and foreign bonds.
Alternatively, the government's foreign position can be decomposed as follows:
interests on net govt. wealth
In words, the trade surplus is the sum of the savings gap of the private sector (households' savings minus domestic …rms'investments) plus the net government savings (recall that, for simplicity, we have assumed that there are no government investments). The latter can be decomposed into the time t tax revenue, the return on government wealth evaluated at the world interest rate, and the losses associated with the IRP. In particular, assuming b t > 0; there are losses (gains) whenever the government sets the interest rate on government debt higher (lower) than the world interest rate.
If the government engages in no active ERP or IRP, then, e t+1 = e t = 1; R t = R w ;
and t = 0: Moreover, b f t = b t since the government would simply enforce the legal obligation that private domestic agents cannot hold foreign assets, by exchanging oneto-one foreign assets for government bonds. The equation above then simpli…es to
21 In the case in which the government imposes a deposit rate R d < R banks make pro…ts that are transferred to the government. These pro…ts should be added to the right-hand side of equation (13) and of the ensuing expressions below.
which is the case studied by SSZ. As emphasized there, s increases over time due to the productivity growth, whereas K F falls due to the declining employment and investments in the F sector during the transition.
Post-transition convergence.
Once the transition is completed at period T all workers are employed in E …rms, N Et = 1 for t > T . Moreover, the aggregate capital stock is given by K Et+1 = 1 1 1+ 1 t+1 m t , which implies standard neoclassical dynamics of capital per e¢ -ciency units;
This law of motion converges to a unique steady state. Along the convergence path, there is capital deepening over time. Consequently, wage growth increases after the transition is completed. Thereafter, wages and output increase towards a steady state. In the posttransition economy all investments are self-…nanced by the managers/entrepreneurs of the E …rms, while the workers' savings feed a large trade surplus. Recall that this extreme form of …nancial constraint is maintained for simplicity here. In SSZ we assume that even E …rms have a partial access to external …nancing, i.e., banks …nance part of the investment process even in the post-transition economy. Figure 7 shows a simulated transition path for the E …rm employment share, wages per e¤ective unit of labor (w t =A t ), total output and trade surplus under the assumption of laissez-faire policies. Namely, in all periods the government sets the interest rate equal to the world interest rate, and the exchange rate equal to one.
Exchange Rate and Interest Rate Policy
In this section we consider the e¤ects of speci…c ERP and IRP. Consider an economy that starts in period zero. From period one and onwards the economy is as described above (we label this as the transition period to emphasize the takeover of the E sector and the decline of the F sector). In period zero, (i.e., the pre-reform period) the economy has a simpler structure: Agents are endowed with some income earned in pre-reform activities. There is no pre-installed capital, and …rms can invest in capital that becomes The government announces a sequence of policies, fe t ; R t+1 ; t+1 g 1 t=0 subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. Note that, since agents live only for two periods, the results would be equivalent if policies were announced, sequentially, one period in advance. We consider a class of …scal policies such that the net government position is constant in the long run. Moreover, we assume that the government pursues a laissezfaire policy from period t = 1 and onwards: for t 1; e t = 1, R t+1 = R w , and t is constant at the level that balances the long run government budget. The focus of our analysis is then on the ERP and IRP set in period zero. The assumption that the activist policy (e 0 6 = 1 and R 1 6 = R w ) lasts only for one period is for simplicity. It is straightforward, but more cumbersome to extend the activist policy beyond period zero.
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Consider the intertemporal budget constraint of the government. Since the tax (or subsidy) is assumed to keep government wealth constant from period one and onwards 22 Our ERP is related to the analysis of Bacchetta et al. (2014) . Based on a di¤erent model, they consider an economy with capital controls and derive the optimal exchange rate policy. They …nd that it is optimal to have an initial real depreciation of the currency followed by an appreciation in the long run. In our paper, we do not attempt to characterize the optimal policy, but focus on the trade-o¤ in welfare across di¤erent social groups (workers vs. entrepreneurs) and cohorts.
(! t =!), then, for all t 1 we have
where, recall, ! t = e t b f t+1 + b t+1 : Consider the initial period, when, recall b 0 = b f 0 = 0 = 0: Thus, the period budget constraint yields:
where b 1 is determined by the domestic savings gap. Next, consider the period budget constraint in period one, imposing that e 1 = 1; and 1 = :
where we have used the facts that = (R w 1)
: Note, again, that b 2 is determined by the domestic savings gap. The same holds true for the following periods, thus, for t 2 we have:
Note that the government net position vis-a-vis the rest of the world equals to! + b t ;
where ! = R 1 Rw 1 e 0 b 1 is the loss incurred to run the ERP and IRP in the …rst period, and b t is the savings gap of the country. Recall that by assumption the government wealth does not grow after period two. Alternatively, we could have assumed that t = 0 for some periods, in which case the government net position would change over time.
Next, we move to calculate b 1 : This is determined by the domestic savings gap:
Finally, we must determine domestic investments, K F;1 and K E;1 . Consider, …rst, the E sector, where investments are determined by the entrepreneurs'savings:
Since > 1; K E;1 is increasing in 1 ; which is in turn increasing in R 1 : Thus, K E;1 is increasing in R 1 : Moreover, K E;1 is increasing in e 0 :
Next, consider the F sector. Following SSZ yields:
The equality stems from the de…nition of F and the fact that employment in the F sector is the residual that clears the labor market after the E …rms have decided their employment. It uses the equilibrium expressions of F;1 given in (4), that of 1 given in (10), and the fact that, from (9), N E;1 = 1
. Note that:
1. K F;1 is decreasing in R 1 via two channels: …rst, because an increase in the interest rate decreases F;1 , and second because it increases the investment rate of entrepreneurs (assuming that > 1), thereby reducing N F;1 ; 2. K F;1 is decreasing in e 0 because a temporarily undervalued exchange rate increases the savings of entrepreneurs (assuming that > 1), thereby speeding up the transition.
Calibration
In this section, we calibrate the model in order to construct a benchmark for the quantitative analysis in the following sections. The usual caveat applies to quantitative predictions derived from two-period models. 23 Nevertheless, a numerical analysis based on realistic parameters is interesting, both to illustrate the properties of the model and to give a sense of how the model predictions are sensitive to changes in the di¤erent parameters.
Our calibration follows Song et al. Finally, we must calibrate the Armington elasticity, ", a parameter that has no counterpart in our earlier studies. We set " = 2, consistent with Feenstra et al. (2014) .
Previous estimates range between a lower bound of unity, based on macro data (e.g.,
Heathcote and Perri 2002) and much higher values in micro studies (e.g., Broda and Weinstein 2006, and Romalis 2007) . Based on these studies, Acemoglu et al. (2012) calibrate (a version of) the Armington elasticity to 3.3.
We assume an annualized world interest rate of 2.5%, i.e., R w = (1:025) 30 . In times of no activist policies, the interest rate on government bonds is set equal to 3.5%, i.e., 24 SSZ documents that in the manufacturing sector domestic private enterprises (DPE) have on average a ratio of pro…ts per unit of book-value capital 9% larger than that of SOEs during the period 1998-2007. A similar di¤erence in rate of return on capital is reported by Islam et al. (2006) . 25 We abstract from long-run productivity growth trends, and set A t = 1 (this is equivalent from considering normalizing wages and output in terms of a trending A t ). Note that the economy nevertheless features GDP growth due to the transition from F …rms to E …rms. 26 There is no consensus in the literature on the magnitude of the IES of consumption. Earlier studies based on macro data estimate the IES to be signi…cantly smaller than unity (Campbell and Mankiw 1989, Hall 1988) . Cooley and Presott (1995) argue for an IES of unity. However, recent studies estimate the IES to be larger than unity (see Attanasio and Vissing-Jørgensen 2003; Gruber 2013; Mulligan 2002) . Based on these studies, Angeletos (2007) argues for calibrating the IES of consumption above unity even in high-frequency dynastic models. In our two-period model, one period is 30 years. It seems plausible that high-frequency ‡uctuations in consumption are more painful to a household than low-frequency ones, because people can adapt their habits when changes occur more gradually.
R = (1:035)
30 -recall that R pins down both the deposit rate and the lending rate to SOEs. We set the iceberg cost to = 0:58 which implies an annualized 5.5% return to capital in SOE. 27 Again, in times of no activist policies we set e t = 1.
We consider the following activist policies:
1. Interest rate policy: we set a higher initial interest rate on government bonds, R 1 = 1:035 30 ). As robustness, we consider alternative policies where R 1 = 1:03
30
and R 1 = 1:045 30 , respectively.
2. Exchange rate policy: we consider a one-period undervaluation of 27% (so, e 0 = 1:27 and e t = 1 for t > 0), in the ball park of estimates from the advocates of the thesis that the undervaluation of the RMB is a signi…cant determinant of China's trade surplus (see, e.g., Goldstein and Lardi 2009). As robustness, we consider undervaluations of 5% and 40%.
E¤ect of ERP and IRP on trade surplus
We start by deriving the implications of the activist policies (ERP and IRP) on the savings gap and on the trade surplus. First, we obtain analytical results. Then, we derive quantitative results based on the calibration described above.
Consider, …rst, the trade surplus:
Both a larger R 1 and a larger e 0 increase savings (s 1 ) and decrease investments in F …rms (K F;1 ). Thus, activist policies involving e 0 > e 1 and R 1 > R w increase unambiguously the savings gap. Next, recall that the expression of the trade surplus in period one yields: increases the trade surplus (as a share of GDP) from 3% to 6.4%. This is due to two forces. On the one hand, since > 1; intertemporal substitution reduces consumption when agents face a higher deposit rate. On the other hand, a higher interest rate makes borrowing more expensive for F …rms, thereby reducing externally …nanced investments (note that the investments of E …rms increase, but this is irrelevant for the trade surplus, since it is …nanced entirely through the savings of entrepreneurs). The gap shrinks in period 1 and is reverted from period 2 and onwards, re ‡ecting, as explained above, that the government is poorer and must levy a tax. Panel (b) shows the e¤ect of the ERP.
The e¤ect is qualitatively similar to that of the IRP, but quantitatively smaller. The trade surplus (as a share of GDP) increases from 3% to 4.1% in the …rst period, then the economy runs a slightly lower surplus than in the laissez-faire benchmark. Recall that this e¤ect hinges on the assumption that > 1; i.e., agents'savings increase when the price of consumption goods decreases over time. 1:05 and e 0 = 1:4). Again, the larger the ERP the larger the e¤ects. Remarkably, a small undervaluation corresponding to the lower end of the empirical estimates has hardly any e¤ect. A dubiously realistic 40% undervaluation has only a marginal incremental e¤ect relative to the 27% benchmark.
Our model shows that savings rate and trade surplus are a¤ected by the real exchange rate dynamics, but independent of its level. In other words, the ERP a¤ects trade surplus only if the real exchange rate varies over time. Intuitively, the anticipation of future appreciation (depreciation) would increase the returns of holding domestic assets, resulting in a higher (lower) savings rate and, hence, a bigger (smaller) surplus.
The prediction that a larger trade surplus is associated with the expectation of an appreciation of the exchange rate is broadly in line with the empirical evidence discussed above.
As explained above, the e¤ect of an expected real appreciation on the trade surplus works through the savings rate (consumers delay purchasing expensive import goods). This suggests that other factors other than the exchange rate policy have been at work.
See Storesletten and Zilibotti (2014) for a review of factors a¤ecting the savings rate and investments in China.
E¤ect of ERP and IRP on real wages
Consider, next, the e¤ects of the activist policies on real wages. For simplicity, we restrict attention to the baseline activist policies. The equilibrium expression of w t in equation (5) is increasing in R t and independent of e t . However, one should bear in mind that w t is expressed in terms of units of the domestic good, and is not the real wage in terms of the consumption basket. Since households consume both domestic and foreign 1 0 0 a g g r e g a te s a v in g r a te ( le ft) R EER ( r ig h t) Figure 10 : The solid and dashed lines are the aggregate savings rates (%), the left axis, and the annual real e¤ective exchange rate, the right axis, respectively. The annual real e¤ective exchange rates are the average of the normalized quarterly real e¤ective exchange rates in Figure 1. goods, the real wage is a¤ected by changes in the relative prices. Given our isoelastic preferences, the consumers'price level is given by
Since the price level is increasing in e t ; the real wage is decreasing in e t .
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Figure 11 compares the real wage (w t =P t ) trajectories corresponding to alternative activist policies (R 1 = 1:035
30 and e 0 = 1:27; respectively) with those under the laissezfaire policy. Under laissez-faire, the normalized real wage is constant throughout the transition (i.e., until period 2). Thereafter, when E …rms employ the whole labor force, wages grow due to capital deepening and converge to their steady state level, as explained in section 3.3.
Panel A shows the e¤ect of the IRP. Wages in period 1 are lower than under laissezfaire, because a higher lending rate reduces capital intensity and, hence, the wage rate paid by F …rms. Once the activist policy is over, wages are the same as under laissezfaire. However, the transition is faster under the IRP, because the high cost of external …nancing speeds up the demise of F …rms. In addition, higher pro…ts increase entrepreneurs'propensity to save since > 1: The faster transition triggers an earlier onset 
E¤ect of ERP and IRP on GDP
Consider, next, the e¤ect of activist policies on GDP. A higher e 0 stimulates growth by increasing savings and capital accumulation in the E sector. A higher R 1 implies a lower capital labor ratio in F …rms and a lower wage in period one. This per se reduces the output of F …rms. At the same time, a higher level of R 1 speeds up (precisely by reducing wage costs) capital accumulation and growth of E …rms. Since E …rms are 29 The quantitative e¤ects are sensitive to the assumption of the two-period model, here. In a model where one period is one year and the annual depreciation rate were 8%, an increase in the lending rate from 5.5% to 6.5% would lower wages by 7%. In contrast, in our two-period model the corresponding interest rate policy, i.e., increasing the annualized interest rate from 5.5% to 6.5%, lowers wages by 25%. The reason for this discrepancy is that the depreciation rate cannot be lower than zero in a two-period model. The quantitative implications from two-period models should be interpreted subject to this caveat. more productive, the composition e¤ect causes an increase in the average TFP, and thus in GDP. Hence, the e¤ect of increasing R 1 is ambiguous. More formally, let Y t denote total GDP. Since the working population is constant and normalized to unity, then Y t is also GDP per worker. Thus, for t 1 :
The …rst line follows from the fact that Y F;t = A t F;t and Y E;t = A t E;t , and from the de…nition of F and E : Then, using expression (9), and rearranging terms, one gets the right-hand side expression in the …rst line. The second equality follows from eliminating F and N E using (4) and (8).
Consider policy interventions in the …rst period. An increase in e 0 increases output Y t for all t 1 by increasing K E;t . An increase in R 1 has instead ambiguous net e¤ects.
As discussed above, it decreases F;t and increases N E;t via its e¤ects on wages and on entrepreneurs'savings rates. The sign of the e¤ect hinges on K E;1 : If the entrepreneurial sector is initially very small, the activist policy decreases output initially, and increases it in future. Figure 12 shows the quantitative e¤ect of the baseline activist policies relative to laissez-faire. Panel A shows the e¤ect of the IRP. Initially, the activist policy reduces output growth. The quantitative e¤ect is large, and comparable to the e¤ect on wages.
However, after the …rst period the economy bene…ts from the faster capital accumulation in the E sector, implying a faster convergence to the steady state. Panel B shows the e¤ect of the ERP. In this case, the e¤ect is very small and barely visible in the graph.
Even a 40% undervaluation yields similar results. This suggests that the manipulation of the exchange rate is not a quantitatively important channel for growth.
Robustness
In this section, we perform some sensitivity analysis to variations in the preference elasticities and ". We focus on these parameters since there is some uncertainty about their magnitudes in the empirical literature, as discussed above. We focus on the e¤ects on the trade surplus.
Consider, …rst, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. As discussed above, the e¤ect of the ERP hinges on > 1: Figure 13 shows the results under the alternative values 2 f1:01; 2:5g: When = 1:01; agents are less willing to substitute consumption intertemporally, and thus they save less. This has two main consequences for the IRP. First, the IRP has no e¤ect on the trade surplus in period zero. Second, the transition is slower since managers save less and capital accumulation in E …rms is more moderate. The ERP has no impact, and overall has very small e¤ects, when = 1: In particular, a change in e 0 leaves savings una¤ected due to the cancellation of an income and a substitution e¤ect. The only e¤ect of the policy is through the government budget constraint, and its sign is generally ambiguous. In the calibrated economy featuring a structural trade surplus, the EPR entails a cost for the government which purchases foreign bonds at unfavorable terms of trade. The government de…cit causes a small decline in future trade surpluses. When = 2:5; the results are qualitatively similar, if quantitatively stronger, than in the baseline experiment with = 2 (see Figure 13) . Consider, next, the Armington elasticity ". The IRP is not a¤ected by the value of ": To see why, note that in our model the propensity to consume equals
( 1)=(" 1) g. When e t = e t+1 , the Armington elasticity has no impact on consumption and savings. Thus, the e¤ect of the IRP is invariant to ", given that we assume e 0 = 1 in this policy experiment. However, the Armington elasticity does in ‡uence the e¤ectiveness of the ERP. The e¤ect of the ERP The laissez-faire is invariant to ": is decreasing in ": To see why, note that when the Armington elasticity is high, agents are more willing to substitute domestic for foreign goods in response to a temporary undervaluation, implying a smaller e¤ect on savings. Thus, a low Armington elasticity is equivalent to a larger e¤ective temporary undervaluation. The quantitative e¤ects across the range of empirically plausible estimates are tiny. Figure 14 shows the results under the alternative values " 2 f1; 3:3g. Lowering " from 3:3 to 1 increases the …rst-period trade surplus from 4% to 4.1% under the ERP (note that the laissez-faire is independent of " since e t = 1 for all t).
Welfare e¤ects of ERP and IRP
In this section we explore the welfare and distributional e¤ects of the activist policies.
We consider, how di¤erent policies a¤ect workers relative to entrepreneurs within each cohort and across generations. Welfare e¤ects are evaluated in terms of equivalent variation, namely, the percentage increase in consumption under the laissez-faire policy needed to make the agent indi¤erent between the laissez-faire and the activist policy. Consider, next, the IRP. The initial generation perceives a small welfare gain due to the high interest rates on savings, while their endowment is una¤ected by assumption.
The generation of workers born in period 1 su¤ers a large (30%) welfare loss from an increase in R 1 , due to the lower wages (see Figure 11 ). For the same reason, managers and entrepreneurs of E …rms bene…t from an increase in R 1 . All subsequent generations of managers gain, since they work in "larger" …rms, earning a higher compensation when working as managers, and then operate larger …rms themselves as old entrepreneurs. In other terms, the e¤ect of the larger capital accumulation in the …rst period triggered by the distortion has a permanent e¤ect on the welfare of all subsequent generations of entrepreneurs (the e¤ect only vanishes asymptotically). The welfare e¤ects for the workers are more complex. The pre-tax wages of the worker are not a¤ected until time 3, when the transition is over. However, all workers pay higher taxes to make up for the capital losses of the government. Thus, on the one hand, the earlier generations living through the economic transition su¤er a loss from the activist policies. On the other hand, the activist policy speeds up the transition, implying that the wage growth induced by capital deepening starts earlier.
Consider, next, the ERP. The …rst generations of both workers and entrepreneurs are worse o¤ under the activist policy, because foreign goods are more expensive, and their consumption is distorted both intra-and intertemporally. The welfare e¤ect is quantitatively large, amounting to 5.0% for managers 8.0% for workers. The subsequent generations of managers also gain, due to the larger capital accumulation in the …rst period (see the discussion for the IRP). For workers, the e¤ects are ambiguous, mirroring the discussion of the ERP.
Interestingly, while both the IRP and the ERP are growth-enhancing, neither bene…ts the workers until the end of the transition (period 3 in the calibrated economy). Thus, the activist policies cause persistent losses for the workers that extend over several generations.
Internal Financial Liberalization
In this section, we extend the model presented above to study the e¤ect of regulations of the domestic banking sector, and of their removal, i.e., …nancial liberalization. To simplify the analysis, we assume that home and foreign goods are perfect substitutes, i.e., " ! 1; as in SSZ. Moreover, we assume that e t = 1 and R t = R; for all t: Generalizing the analysis along these dimensions is straightforward and yields no surprising additional implications.
To capture more accurately the pre-reform scenario, we assume that the deposit rate is not determined by market forces, but by regulation. More precisely, the government sets a ceiling on the deposit rate, denoted by R d < R. This implies, as discussed below, that the statutory maximum deposit rate is binding. Once a bank o¤ers the maximum deposit rate R d , there is nothing the bank can do to attract more deposits. Moreover, deposits are the only source of external funds for the banks -in particular, banks cannot issue bonds nor can they borrow from abroad, due to capital controls. Since banking activity ceases to be a veil (banks, as we will see, make pro…ts in equilibrium), it is useful for future reference to discuss the nature of competition between banks more speci…cally.
Then, we assume that there is a set of incumbent banks engaging in a two-stage Bertrand competition game. The total pro…ts of the banking industry are transferred to the government. 30 For simplicity, throughout this section we restrict attention to equilibria 30 This is for simplicity. We could alternatively assume that the pro…ts accrue to a separate group, featuring a positive trade surplus, i.e., such that banks hold government bonds in their portfolio.
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The following assumption describes more formally the competition between banks.
Assumption 2 Competition in the banking industry is described by the following twostage game: (stage i) banks compete ( à la Bertrand) in o¤ering …rms lending contracts specifying a loan size and an interest rate; (stage ii) banks compete ( à la Bertrand) in o¤ering workers deposit contracts; (stage iii) if in stage ii all banks have raised su¢ cient funds to honor stage i contracts, contracts are enforced; otherwise, no exchange take place, and the game restarts from stage i.
The equilibrium characterization is simple. In the second stage, banks compete to attract depositors. Since banks can earn the rate of return R on government bonds, absent regulation, competition would drive the deposit rate up to R: However, due to the ceiling on deposit rates, all banks will o¤er the maximum rate R d : In the …rst stage, banks will choose a portfolio consisting of government bonds and loans to F …rms, for which they charge an interest rate R l = R= (1 ). 32 Charging a lower rate would be suboptimal, since it would yield a net return lower than government bonds. Finally, competition prevents banks from charging a higher rate of return on loans.
Consider the e¤ect of deregulating the deposit rate. The deposit rate would then increase to R; and banks'pro…ts would vanish. There would be no e¤ect on the lending rate, implying no general equilibrium e¤ect through wages. Households would enjoy a higher rate of return on their savings. Depending on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption, this might yield higher or lower savings. In the log case, there is no e¤ect on the savings of the young. However, the higher rate of return increases unambiguously the consumption of the old. Thus, the sole e¤ect of the deregulation is a transfer from the government to the old consumers. Since the government neither consumes nor invests, while the old consume all their income, the deregulation reduces the trade surplus, at least as long as the savings rate does not increase too much in response to the higher deposit rate (the trade surplus falls unambiguously in the case the bankers, or that they are rebated to consumers as lump sums. Since the major Chinese banks are state-owned, it makes sense to consolidate their pro…ts with those of the government. 31 Otherwise, banks would like to borrow from the government or from the foreign sector. However, since capital controls forbid that, loans must equal deposits, as in the equilibrium of a neoclassical closed-economy model. In this case, the interest rate on loans would be lower than R: We ignore this case since China has a very large foreign surplus. 32 As discussd above, China had a ‡oor on lending rates, which was removed in July 2013. For simplicity, we ignore such constraint, assuming that it is not binding. of logarithmic utility). In summary, the deregulation of deposit rates has no e¤ect on the production side of the economy. In particular, it has no e¤ect on transition nor on economic growth. The only macroeconomic e¤ect is a change (most likely, a decrease) in the aggregate savings rate and in the net foreign position of China.
The comparative statics above hinges on the assumption that the regulation does not a¤ect entry in the banking industry. In the model above, incumbent (in China, state-owned) banks capture all deposits and make all loans. However, these banks are ine¢ cient insofar as they do not lend to private …rms. However, one might expect that more competition would trigger the entry of di¤erent types of banks that are more prone to lend to entrepreneurs. To explore this possibility, one we regard as highly realistic in the Chinese institutional context, we expand the model and allow competition among di¤erent types of banks. We distinguish between incumbent banks (behaving as described above) and fringe banks. The latter are prepared to lend to private …rms, either due to a better monitoring technology, or due to better governance that makes them less biased in favor of F …rms. In China, this might capture the notion that fringe banks are private rather than state owned. However, fringe banks have a small disadvantage in collecting deposits: incumbents have a well-established network of branches and customers, which makes it costly for fringe banks to attract depositors unless they o¤er higher rates. In particular, we assume that savers would strictly prefer the deposits o¤ered by incumbent banks at the rate R d unless fringe banks o¤er at least R d + ; where > 0:
We model the lending behavior of fringe banks as follows. They can lend to F …rms and purchase government bonds at the same terms as do incumbent banks. In addition, they can lend to E …rms subject to a moral hazard constraint. Following SSZ, we assume that entrepreneurs can pledge to repay a share of the second-period net pro…ts. The parameter can be interpreted as a productivity parameter in the production function of fringe banks: the higher the banks'monitoring capability, the higher ; and the less tight the borrowing constraint faced by entrepreneurs. Alternatively, can be thought of as an inverse measure of the capture of banks' policy from special interests. For instance, if banks are biased in favor of state-owned enterprises, this would be re ‡ected in a smaller , i.e., less lending to private …rms. Note that incumbents are a particular case of fringe banks, with = = 0:
Assumption 3 The bank industry comprises two types of banks: "incumbent" and "fringe" banks. The two types of banks di¤er in two dimensions: larger . Namely, entrepreneurs can pledge to repay a share > 0 of the secondperiod net pro…ts when they borrow from fringe banks, while = 0 for incumbent banks.
Consider the optimal contract between fringe banks and entrepreneurs, when fringe banks are active. The E …rm's capital stock comprises now not only the savings of young entrepreneurs, but also the loans from fringe banks:
The borrowing constraint of entrepreneurs yields:
This constraint is binding as long as < R l = , which we assume to be the case. Thus, the share of private investments …nanced through bank loans is
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium of the banking industry before and after the deregulation reform in an environment comprising both incumbent and fringe banks.
Proposition 1 (i) In a "pre-reform" equilibrium (with regulation): Incumbent banks o¤er the ceiling deposit rate R d and attract all savings from workers; they hold an asset portfolio comprising loans to F …rms (with an interest rate of R l = R= (1 )) and government bonds, both yielding a rate of return net of intermediation costs of R > R d :
Fringe banks are not active.
(ii) In a "post-reform" equilibrium (with no regulation): Incumbent banks o¤er the deposit rate R and attract a positive share of the savings from workers; they hold an asset portfolio comprising loans to F …rms (with an interest rate of R l = R= (1 )) and government bonds, both yielding a rate of return net of intermediation costs of R: Fringe banks o¤er the deposit rate R + and attract a positive share of the savings from workers; they hold an asset portfolio comprising only loans to E …rms with an interest rate of R l;e = (R + ) = (1 ) :
Proof. Pre-reform. In the second stage, no bank can o¤er deposit rates higher than Post-reform. In the second stage, a deviant incumbent (fringe) o¤ering a deposit rate lower than R (R + ) will attract no customers, whereas a deviant incumbent o¤ering a deposit rate higher than R (R + ) will make losses. In the …rst stage, suppose a deviant incumbent (fringe) bank o¤ers a lending rate above R= (1 ) ((R + ) = (1 )): A deviation of an incumbent bank below R= (1 ) is also unpro…table, since the deviant bank could increase its pro…ts by investing in bonds and earning a net rate R: A deviation of a fringe bank below (R + ) = (1 ) is also unpro…table, since the deviant bank is then unable to raise funds for any interest rate below R+ : Finally, at the equilibrium deposit and lending rates both incumbent and fringe banks will be able to raise su¢ cient funds to honour the lending contracts, since, at the equilibrium interest rates, the aggregate demand of deposits exceeds the aggregate demand of loans.
A stark result of the proposition is that the regulation of deposit rates sti ‡es competition in the banking industry, at the expense of the more productive E …rms. In the post-reform competitive equilibrium, all banks' pro…ts are driven to zero by competition. Incumbent banks set the deposit rate to R, and invest the resources collected in government bonds and loans to F …rms. Fringe banks set the deposit rate to R + -the minimum rate required for them to attract customers -and lend exclusively to E …rms, at an interest rate of (R + ) = (1 ) : In a deregulated economy, E …rms still face less favorable lending conditions, but fare better than under regulation, since they can access external …nancing.
In this environment, the deregulation of deposit rates has large e¤ects on productivity and growth. A simple extension of the analysis in SSZ shows that the growth rate of entrepreneurial capital, the key measure of the speed of economic transition, is given by:
l;e 
where = (1 ) 1 1 R= (1 ), and R l;e = (R + ) = (1 ) is the rate at which entrepreneurs can borrow from fringe banks, as long as these are active. The key parameter is ; a measure of the access of E …rms to external …nancing. K Et+1 =K Et is increasing in ; and so are the growth rates of aggregate output and productivity. The pre-reform equilibrium is a particular case of (15) where = 0; hence:
which is the lower bound of the transition rate, given the other parameters.
The analysis so far has assumed that incumbent banks do not lend at all to entrepreneurs. From a descriptive standpoint it is more realistic to assume that all banks lend to E …rms, but that incumbent banks impose tighter borrowing constraints re ‡ecting their bias against private …rms. Formally, incumbent banks also lend to private …rms, being subject to a tighter constraint, 0 < ; than are fringe banks. In this case, incumbent banks will lend to both F …rms and E …rms, whereas fringe banks will provide top-up …nancing to E …rms, at higher lending rates.
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Corollary 1 Suppose incumbent banks also lend to E …rms, but entrepreneurs can only pledge a fraction 0 < of their second-period pro…t when they borrow from incumbent banks. Then, (i) In a "pre-reform" equilibrium (with regulation): Incumbent banks o¤er the ceiling deposit rate R d and attract all savings from workers; they hold an asset portfolio comprising loans to F …rms and E …rms (with an interest rate of R l = R= (1 )),
and government bonds, all yielding a rate of return net of intermediation costs of R > R d :
(ii) In a "post-reform" equilibrium (with no regulation): Incumbent banks o¤er the deposit rate R and attract a positive share of the savings from workers; they hold an asset portfolio comprising loans to F …rms and E …rms (with an interest rate of R l = R= (1 )), and government bonds, all yielding a rate of return net of intermediation costs of R: Fringe banks o¤er the deposit rate R + and attract a positive share of the savings from workers. They hold an asset portfolio comprising only of top-up loans to E …rms (i.e., loans in excess of the maximum …nancing that E …rms can get from incumbent banks) with an interest rate of R l;e = (R + ) = (1 ) :
The proof is a simple extension of the proof of Proposition 1 and is omitted. The corollary shows that the main insights of Proposition 1 are robust to less extreme assumptions.
33 Note that we assume that all loans are observable. In addition, E-…rms'loans with incumbent banks have more seniority. Thus, if an E-…rm collateralizes a share 0 of its future pro…t with an incumbent bank, it can only collateralize an additional share 0 when it turns to a fringe bank for a top-up loan.
In summary, liberalizing the deposit market is likely to speed up privatization, productivity, and growth. Before the liberalization, the entrepreneurial capital grows at the constant rate g reg , which dictates the rate of growth of employment in E …rms and the average growth rate of GDP. At the time of deregulation, the entrepreneurial capital jumps upwards and, subsequently, continues to grow at a higher rate (g lib ) than before. The deregulation has no immediate e¤ect on wages. However, since deregulation speeds up the transition, the time at which the transition ends (i.e., when all workers are employed in E …rms) will arrive earlier. Thus, so will the time when wage growth accelerates (time T in Figure 11 ).
So far, we have considered only the e¤ects of a deregulation of interest rates on deposits. However, China is considering a farther-reaching reform that should lead to the full liberalization of cross-border investments. What would the e¤ect of such a reform be? In our model, opening the capital account completely would have e¤ects that are similar, and possibly stronger, than those of an internal deregulation. In particular, foreign investors and intermediaries could introduce improvements equivalent to a further increase in or, possibly a reduction in the intermediation costs : This latter would be the case if foreign entities could bring additional expertise, or if they could trigger an increase in equity …nancing. A reduction in would have additional e¤ects. In particular, it would increase lending to both E …rms and F …rms, and this, in turn, would cause an increase in the capital-labor ratios of all …rms and in wages.
Conclusions
In this paper we study the role of policy and …nancial reforms in an environment characterized by asymmetric …nancial frictions and active controls on international capital ‡ows. We focus on exchange rate policy, interest rate policy, and the deregulation of interest rate controls. We show that these policies interact with, and possibly strengthen, the structural transformation of China analyzed in our previous work, characterized by the high productivity growth and the accumulation of a foreign assets. In particular, the policy interventions appear to have compressed wages and increased the wealth of entrepreneurs, relaxing the borrowing constraints of private …rms (see Itskhoki and Moll 2014 and Wang 2014 for related discussions of policy interventions in credit constrained economies).
Contrary to a popular perception in the West, we do not argue that China's trade surplus originates from policy interventions only. Our theory predicts that the imbal-ance is a natural outcome of the process of transformation under …nancial constraints.
However, we show that activist exchange rate and monetary policies may have magni…ed some of the e¤ects relative to the laissez-faire. As far as the exchange rate policy is concerned, we document that the real exchange rate of China underwent a signi…cant appreciation after 2006, following a period during which it was, arguably, undervalued.
Our theory predicts that the initial undervaluation, followed by a later realignment, may have strengthened economic growth and contributed to the accumulation of foreign assets in the mid-2000's. As for the real interest policy, we document that, although the real return on savings has been signi…cantly lower in China than the stellar return on real investments, the Chinese real deposit rate and the rate of return on domestic bonds have been on average 0.9% higher than the rate on US T-bills. To the extent to which this indicates that the BPOC has kept the interest rate higher than the world rate, this policy has also contributed to economic growth and to the accumulation of foreign reserves. Both policies have increased savings and reduced consumption.
In the second part of the paper, we study the e¤ect of a deregulation of deposit rates as a vehicle of increasing competition in the domestic banking sector. China has not yet made major reforms in this direction, but these are imminent, according to the recent announcements of the PBOC. The government has also launched a new free trade zone in the Shanghai area where o¤shore banking and capital transactions will be heavily deregulated. We show that as long as liberalization reduces the bias of the …nancial system against small and medium private enterprises, …nancial deregulation will promote growth and reduce the trade surplus. The predictions of our theory are in line with the empirical …ndings of Fan and Kalemli-Ozcan (2014) who study the e¤ects of …nancial reforms on …rm-level investments in a panel of Asian emerging economies.
They …nd that …nancial reforms reduce savings and increase investments in private …rms relative to state-owned …rms, a pattern which conforms with the main mechanism of our theory. These …ndings further support our conviction that …nancial reforms may become a major engine of growth in future China.
